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Available online 15 March 2017Degrowth has evolved within a decade from an activist movement into a multi-disciplinary academic paradigm.
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cles that were published between 2006 and 2015. We ﬁnd that the academic degrowth discourse occupies a small
but expanding niche at the intersection of social and applied environmental sciences. The discourse is shaped by au-
thors from high-income, mainly Mediterranean, countries. Until 2012, articles largely constitute conceptual essays
endorsed by normative claims. More recently, degrowth has branched out into modelling, empirical assessments,
and the study of concrete implementations. Authors tend to agree in that economic growth cannot be sustained
ad inﬁnitum on a resource constraint planet and that degrowth requires far reaching societal change. Whether
degrowth should be considered as a collectively consented choice or an environmentally-imposed inevitability con-
stitutes amajor debate amongdegrowth thinkers.We argue that the academic discourse could beneﬁt from rigid hy-
potheses testing through input-outputmodelling, material ﬂow analysis, life-cycle assessments, or social surveys. By
analyzing the potentials for non-market value creation and identifying concrete well-being beneﬁts, the degrowth
discourse could receive wider public support and contribute to a paradigmatic change in the social sciences.).
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The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has spurred research on alternative devel-
opment trajectories for the global economy. Among the diverse streamsaccess article underof thought, degrowth has emerged as a radical call for a voluntary
and equitable downscaling of the economy towards a sustainable, just,
and participatory steady-state society (R&D, 2010; Schneider et al.,
2010; Kallis, 2011). As a political slogan with theoretical and practical
implications (Latouche, 2010), degrowth postulates that indeﬁnite eco-
nomic growth on a ﬁnite planet is impossible; facilitating growth as the
overarching aim of socio-economic policy will eventually lead tothe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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consequences.
In less than a decade, degrowth has evolved from an activist move-
ment into a vibrant multi-disciplinary academic ﬁeld, grounding in
Georgescu-Roegen's (1971) thermodynamic analysis of the economy,
Meadows' et al. (1972) limits to growth, and Daly's (1973, 1997) work
on the steady-state economy. Degrowth resonates the anti-utilitarian
ideas of Ghandi, Illich, Schumacher, and Latouche (see, e.g., Latouche,
2010; Demaria et al., 2013;Muraca, 2013), draws fromanthropology, so-
ciology, and philosophy, and links to inter-disciplinary research in eco-
logical economics and industrial ecology (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010).
The number of peer-refereed articles on degrowth has been growing
steadily since 2006. By mid-2016, six dedicated conferences had
been organized, seven special issues were published, and an new
special issue on degrowth and technology was already in preparation.
Yet, a review of the peer-refereed literature that takes stock of the aca-
demic degrowth discourse and identiﬁes its magnitude, trends, and
unresolved research questions is yet missing. Here, we attempt such
a reviewwith the aim to (i) structure the degrowth discourse, (ii) iden-
tify areas for future research, and ultimately (iii) help devising
implementable degrowth solutions.
The article continues with an explanation of our research method
(Section 2) and an overview of key statistics characterizing the
degrowth discourse (Section 3). We sketch important topics of the
peer-refereed literature in Section 4 and identify knowledge gaps to
be addressed as part of a more comprehensive research program in
Section 5. The article ﬁnishes with a discussion and conclusions in
Sections 6 and 7.
2. Materials and Methods
Our review is based on a web-search for peer-refereed journal arti-
cles in the online data base ‘Scopus’. We include research articles, com-
ments, and editorials that contain the words ‘degrowth’ or ‘de-growth’
in their title and were published in the English language before 31 De-
cember 2015. This approach yields a timely overview of the academic
degrowth literature but is subject to four limitations:
• Potentially relevant articles that do not explicitlymention ‘degrowth’ in
their title are excluded (e.g., Daly, 2010;Mauerhofer, 2013b; Alexander,
2013b; Knight et al., 2013; Antal, 2014; Martínez-Alier et al., 2014;
Fitzgerald et al., 2015) even if these are published as a part of a special
issue on degrowth (i.e., the following 11 articles: Alcott (2010),
D'Alessandro et al. (2010), Hamilton (2010), Hueting (2010), Matthey
(2010), Spangenberg (2010), van den Bergh (2010), Johanisova and
Wolf (2012), Latouche (2012), Tammilehto (2012), Dobson (2013)1).
• Research published in languages other than English is excluded
(e.g., Bonaiuti, 2013).
• Contributions to the ﬁve global conferences on degrowth are excluded,
if these have not been published as peer-refereed journal articles.
• Monographs (e.g., Daly, 1973, 1997; Jackson, 2009) are excluded aswell
as the non-peer-refereed ‘gray’ literature on degrowth.
The ﬁrst limitation is justiﬁed by the need to set boundaries for our
review that prevent discussions about the inclusion versus exclusion of
publications while at the same time rendering the research feasible
within the resources available to us. The second limitation is born out
of practical constraints but could indeed be justiﬁed by the observation
that English constitutes the Lingua franca of the global research commu-
nity. The third and fourth limitations reﬂect our concerns about the sci-
entiﬁc relevance of publications that are not peer-refereed. Moreover,
the exclusion of conference contributions canbe justiﬁed because select-
ed research presented at the various degrowth conferences has been1 We deviate from this approach in the case of Muraca (2013) who refers in the title of
her article to ‘Décroissance’, i.e., the French synonym for ‘degrowth’.also published as peer-refereed articles in special issues and is thus in-
cluded in our review (see Table S1 in the Supplementary Material).
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the academic degrowth dis-
course may have drawn fundamentally from publications that are ex-
cluded from this review. Jackson and Victor (2015a), for example, ﬁnd
that declining growth rates may not inevitably raise social inequality.
This observation is relevant for the degrowth discourse but not further
discussed here. We would therefore argue that the results and conclu-
sions presented in this article are valid, strictly speaking, only for the lit-
erature included in our review. Yet, our insights could be considered
indicative of the major trends and open research questions of the aca-
demic degrowth discourse in general.
To minimize errors in the interpretation of the reviewed articles, we
have shared with the corresponding authors, as far as possible, our in-
terpretation of their work. For 60 out of the 91 reviewed articles, we
have received a positive response conﬁrming our understanding of the
presented research.
We complement our review by a Google search to elicit the magni-
tude and popularity of the degrowth discourse compared to the more
general debate on environmental sustainability and economic growth.
The outcome of this search is presented next.
3. Key Statistics of the Degrowth Discourse
By 1 May 2016, the internet search engine Google lists 253,000 web
pages in response to the search term ‘degrowth’. This number is small
compared to the 101 million and 114 million pages listed in response
to the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘sustainability’ and the 46.5 million
webpages listed on ‘economic growth’. The term ‘post growth’
(580,000 webpages) appears to be more popular than degrowth.2 Still,
the number of webpages on degrowth has been increasing by a factor
of 20 since 2006, showing an average annual growth rate of some
150% (Fig. 1a). The number of dedicated Google searches for ‘degrowth’
are ﬂuctuating at around 27±12 permonthwith a pronounced peak in
early 2014, presumably related to the degrowth conference in Leipzig,
Germany (Fig. 1b).
The relatively low but steadily increasing popularity of degrowth is
also reﬂected by the growing number of peer-refereed articles pub-
lished yearly (Fig. 2). The ﬁrst articles referring to ‘degrowth’ in their
title appeared in the English academic literature around the year 2006.
By 31 December 2015, 91 articles had been published (Table A1 in
the Appendix; Table S1 in the Supplementary Material). These were
written by 108 authors and published in 23 journals. Twenty articles
were published by the Journal of Cleaner Production, 18 by Ecological
Economics, 10 by Futures, and 8 each by Environmental Values and Cap-
italism Nature Socialism. A ﬁrst special issue on degrowth was pub-
lished in 2010 by the Journal of Cleaner Production. Since then, seven
special issues comprising a total of 53 articles (including editorials)
have been dedicated to degrowth; an eighth special issue on degrowth
and technology is to be published in fall 2016 (Kerschner et al., 2015).
Authors from around the globe contribute to the academic degrowth
discourse; yet themajority of articles originate fromEurope,with a clear
dominance of contributions from Spain (Figs. 3 and 4a). This observa-
tion supports the hypothesis of Romano (2012) who suggests that the
socio-economic conditions of the capitalist periphery in Mediterranean
Europe may be suitable for developing and implementing degrowth.
With the exception of Boillat et al. (2012) and Escobar (2015), none
of the articles were written by authors afﬁliated with institutions in
emerging or low-income countries. The overwhelming majority of arti-
cles is written by a single author (Figs. 3 and 4b), pointing to a close link
of the degrowth discourse to social sciences where single-author publi-
cations are more common than in natural sciences and engineering.
Moreover, co-author collaborations often remain within the same2 The number of relevant web pages is identiﬁed by using quotation marks as Google
search operator.
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Fig. 1. Indicative number of webpages published yearly on ‘degrowth’ (a) and number of
monthly Google searches for degrowth (b). Fig. 1a only considers webpages with a
publication date (n = 50,300), accounting for a quarter of the total number of webpages
(253,000) listed by Google in response to the search term ‘degrowth’.
222 M. Weiss, C. Cattaneo / Ecological Economics 137 (2017) 220–230institution, suggesting a lack of international and even global exchange
of views that could, however, diversify and advance the academic
degrowth discourse.
When expanding our search to peer-refereed publications that refer
in their title, abstract, or keywords to degrowth, we identify a total of
183 articles (Fig. 2). This observations suggest that our review indeed
only addresses a part of the relevant degrowth literature.Col 5 
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Fig. 2. Number of peer-refereed articles explicitly referring to degrowth; this review
considers only peer-refereed articles that contain the terms ‘degrowth’ or ‘de-growth’ in
their title.4. Characterizing the Academic Degrowth Discourse
The academic degrowth discourse has emerged from the French cul-
tural critique of the growth imaginary (Latouche, 2005) and from envi-
ronmental and social activism (Demaria et al., 2013; Infante-Amate and
González de Molina, 2013). It draws from the concrete experience of
voluntary simplicity in co-housing communities (Lietaert, 2010), squat-
ting (Cattaneo and Gavaldà, 2010), and neo-ruralism (Martínez-Alier,
2012). The historical ties of the degrowth discourse become apparent
in two features. First, the majority of, mainly earlier, articles discusses
history, context, concepts, and the motivation for degrowth in the
form of structured essays that reﬂect the communication practice of
the social sciences. Only 17 out of 91 articles separate introduction,
methods, results, and discussion as it is typically done in the natural sci-
ences. Second, one third of the reviewed articles contain normative
claims that are inaccessible to rigid scientiﬁc testing, often adhering to
a vision that wants to reclaim democracy and re-politicize economic re-
lations. Grounding in the conceptual work published until 2012, re-
search on degrowth has been recently branching out into more formal
economics, material and energy ﬂow accounting, and empirical case
studies (Fig. 5; Table S2 in the Supplementary Material).
The discourse reﬂects, schematically speaking, two views. The ﬁrst
one, expressed in more than 80% of the articles, considers degrowth as
an ex-ante policy objective, anticipating bio-physical constraints, and
emphasizing the virtue of voluntary frugality and simplicity (R&D,
2010). The second one, expressed in some 20% of the articles, considers
degrowth foremost as an inevitable ex-post socio-economic manage-
ment challenge imposed by ecological or social limits to growth
(e.g., Sorman and Giampietro, 2013).
The attitudes about degrowth include:
• unanimous support (e.g., Kallis, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010; Kallis
and March, 2015)
• neutrality that (i) takes a positive stance to investigate degrowth sce-
narios (e.g., Cattaneo and Gavaldà, 2010; Xue, 2014) or (ii) uses
degrowth as frame for empirical analysis (e.g., Infante-Amate and
González de Molina, 2013; Kalimeris et al., 2014)
• skepticism and rejection.
About 20% of articles fall into the last category, including opposition
on economic grounds (e.g., Tokic, 2012) and for practical reasons (van
den Bergh, 2011; Schwartzman, 2012; Saed, 2012). Radical anarchist
thinkers as Fotopoulos (2007, 2010a, 2010b) and Trainer (2012, 2014)
consider degrowth as insufﬁcient to address contemporary sustainabil-
ity challenges; skeptics who oppose the paradigmatic degrowth vision
include Romano (2012) and Sorman and Giampietro (2013).
About two thirds of the reviewed articles address matters of univer-
sal spatial and temporal validity;more than a third of articles focuses on
conceptual, philosophical, social, or political aspects of degrowth.
Among the articles engaging in a multi-dimensional conceptual discus-
sion, the conceptualization of degrowth by Schneider et al. (2010,
2011), the discussion of degrowth and democracy by Ott (2012), and
the controversy between van den Bergh (2011) and Kallis (2011) help
clarifying the scope and challenges of the degrowth proposal.
Out of the 91 articles, 18 present empirical analyses, 18 address case
studies, and 6 engage in formal modelling. Six studies speciﬁcally ad-
dress the emergence and historical context of degrowth (e.g., Fournier,
2008; Sippel, 2009; Muraca, 2013). Levallois (2010) presents a historic
account of the collaboration between Georgescu-Roegen and the Club
of Rome. Twelve articles address economic aspects of degrowth, e.g.,
through a description of the functional principles of the globalized mar-
ket economy that tends to deﬁne a narrow space for activity in favor of
increased efﬁciency, consumption, and private investment in man-
made capital (e.g., Douthwaite, 2012; van Griethuysen, 2010, 2012).
Energy and resource use has received the attention of seven articles.
Speciﬁc aspects of energy supply and demand are addressed by
Fig. 3.The global research arena on degrowth; the size of dots depicts the frequency atwhich authors afﬁliated in a country havepublished articleswith theword ‘degrowth’ or ‘de-growth’
in the title; lines depict co-authorships.
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Fig. 4. Number of author's afﬁliations per country (a) and number of authors per article
(b). The number of author's afﬁliations includes cases where authors are afﬁliated with
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this analysis R&D (2010) that constitutes the collaborative result of the workshop
“Toward a Declaration on Degrowth”, held at the ﬁrst degrowth conference in Paris on
18–19 April 2008.
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Sorman and Giampietro (2013), and Kalimeris et al. (2014). The aca-
demic degrowth discourse has been expanding into formal modelling
(e.g., Bilancini and D'Alessandro, 2012; Andreoni and Galmarini, 2014;
Heikkinen, 2015) and the analysis of household consumption, food
and agriculture, and health (Fig. 5). Technology, has received little at-
tention but when addressed, it is controversially discussed and often
seen critically as cause rather than remedy of persisting sustainability
shortfalls (Trainer, 2010, 2014; Romano, 2012; Pueyo, 2014).
The relationship of degrowth to democracy and work has attracted
special interest. The link between degrowth and democracy is broadly
and controversially discussed among authors, reﬂected by the quest
for a more participatory democracy as an intrinsic element of the
degrowth proposal (R&D, 2010). The issue of work has been addressed
from two angles, the reduction ofworking time as a concretemeasure to
implement degrowth (e.g., van den Bergh, 2011) and the dichotomybe-
tween paid and unpaid work (D'Alisa and Cattaneo, 2013; Nierling,
2012; Andreoni and Galmarini, 2014). Our anecdotal characterization
of the degrowth discourse thus far is complemented by a detailed over-
view of the research presented in each individual article (Table S2 in the
Supplementary Material).
5. Towards a Research Program on Degrowth
5.1. Identifying Knowledge Gaps for Future Research
From our review, we identify ﬁve cross-cutting and non-
complementary domains for future research: (i) the normative founda-
tion of degrowth, (ii) formalmodelling, (iii) empirical assessments, (iv)
engineering and technological innovation, and (v) the implementation
of degrowth. In this section, we sketch out selected knowledge gaps in
these domains before we derive in Section 5.2 research hypotheses
and the contours of a research program.
5.1.1. Clarifying the Normative Foundations of Degrowth
As an ‘activist-led science’ (Martínez-Alier et al., 2011; Demaria
et al., 2013), degrowth has opened a new utopian imaginary (Kallis
andMarch, 2015) based on normative claims. Yet, veriﬁable hypotheses
scrutinizing these claims are often not developed and rigidly tested. This
observation does not dismiss the normative foundations of degrowth
nor do we expect that any normative claim can be put under scientiﬁc
Fig. 5. Stylized evolution of the academic degrowth discourse.
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degrowth can make the academic discourse more credible. The follow-
ing, in part provocative, questions could serve as a reference:
• Are growth policies to be dismissed as unsustainable or could they
help maintaining long-term inﬁnitesimal growth, expanding the
economy asymptotically towards the planetary boundaries (for ex-
ample through further commodiﬁcation of human relations or more
efﬁcient exploitation of natural resources)? If so, howdo such policies
impact the well-being of individuals, the functioning of societal insti-
tutions, and the environment at the various spatial and temporal
scales?
• Is the globalizedmarket economy to be dismissed as inherently unjust
(Trainer, 2010, 2014) or is there scope to redistribute welfare gains to
the losers of globalization? Throughwhichmechanisms can redistrib-
utive policies be strengthened at national and international level?
• If degrowth is to be pursued as a choice (Schneider et al., 2010) of vol-
untary simplicity (Alexander, 2013a), do practitioners fare better rel-
ative to control groups?
The analyses on the public perception of degrowth by Ančić and
Domazet (2015) and on rurban squats as grass-root initiatives by
Cattaneo and Gavaldà (2010) provide ﬁrst insights into the latter ques-
tion. In fact, neither proponents (such as Heikkinen, 2015) nor critics
(such as Romano, 2012) have tested how fast and under which condi-
tions grass-root initiatives can help redeﬁne social norms in a given cul-
tural and economic context.
Likewise, the expectation that environmentally-forced degrowth
will mark a turning point in human development (Quilley, 2013)
could be scrutinized through formal economic modelling or empirical
assessments of the macro- andmicro-economic links between resource
use, pollution, and economic activity.3 Studies on the market potentials
and sustainability effects of high value-added products (e.g., Harasym
and Podeszwa, 2015) provide just one angle to address this topic.
Moreover, case studies on the societal and environmental implica-
tions of recessions can serve as test cases to understand the effective-
ness of proposed degrowth strategies. The ﬁndings of Borowy (2013),
Canavan (2013), and De Vogli and Owusu (2015) may not be general-
ized but provide an important starting point for evaluating policy inter-
ventions in face of environmentally-imposed degrowth.3 The historic observation that decoupling between resource use and gross domestic
product did not happen at global scale does not necessarily imply that decoupling under
constrained resource availability is absolutely infeasible (see however Ward et al.
(2016), who challenge this assertion).5.1.2. Formal Modelling
Formal economic modelling has been criticized for its spurious
accuracy caused by the omission of detail and the application of rigid
mathematical formulations to implausible assumptions (e.g., Daly and
Farley, 2011; Andreoni and Galmarini, 2014). Therefore, the academic
degrowth discourse had long abstained from employing formal
modelling. Recently, however, modelling has made its way into the
degrowth research (e.g., Bilancini and D'Alessandro, 2012; Andreoni
and Galmarini, 2014) and proved useful to understand degrowth im-
pacts in the environmental, economic, and societal domains. Cross-
beneﬁts could materialize from the emerging ﬁeld of ecological
macro-economics, including ecological econophysics (see Pueyo,
2014) that often makes use of formal models (e.g., Jackson and Victor,
2015a, 2015b; Jackson et al., 2016; Bernardo and D'Alessandro, 2014).
More speciﬁcally, formalmodelling can be useful to address two, largely
disregarded, aspects of degrowth: (i) the demonstration of well-being
beneﬁts4 and (ii) the assessment of the functional relationship between
degrowth objectives at various temporal and spatial scales.
5.1.3. Empirical Assessments
Most of the reviewed articles present data to furnish arguments;
however, comprehensive empirical analyses of the degrowth proposal
are still scarce. Focusing on the environment-economy nexus, the
degrowth discourse could beneﬁt from physical input-output analysis,
material ﬂow accounting, and life-cycle assessments. The large liter-
ature body on the environmental Kuznets-curve hypothesis is often
anecdotally referenced but only recently have assessments scruti-
nized the hypothesis with explicit reference to degrowth objectives
(e.g., Mauerhofer, 2013a, Xue, 2015, Ward et al., 2016). Analyses
such as that of Kalimeris et al. (2014) on the GDP-energy link can
clarify the relationship between selected economic activities and
their environmental impacts.
The topic of resource extraction could receive more attention. The as-
sessment of Exner et al. (2014) on copper reserves, in-use stocks, and
substitution potentials could be expanded in a scenario analysis to other
renewable and non-renewable resources, focusing also on the security
of supply and resource equity at various spatial and temporal scales. Eco-
nomic complexity suggests that such researchmay take at best a system's
approach to capture both the direct and indirect impacts of resource use.
Taking a macro-economic perspective, the set of biophysical and so-
cial indicators used by O'Neill (2015) to assess the degree to which na-
tional economies are approaching a steady-state could be expanded by4 Brownhill et al. (2012) argue in the same direction when asking whether degrowth
could present a business plan for enterprises.
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Fig. 6. Thematic overview of the academic degrowth discourse based on 91 peer-refereed articles published between 2007 and 2015.
225M. Weiss, C. Cattaneo / Ecological Economics 137 (2017) 220–230considering impacts on health, environment, and natural resources such
as human toxicity, eutrophication, and land use that are typically quan-
tiﬁed in the context of life cycle assessment (see JRC, 2011).
Empirical assessments are speciﬁcally suited to elicit the unintended
environmental consequences of degrowth objectives (see Xue (2014).
Consumption rebounds resulting from voluntary frugality have been
discussed (e.g., Alcott, 2005, 2008) but not quantiﬁed.
Empirical assessments of degrowth in a social context could start out
with surveys mapping the public perception, thereby complementing
and expanding the analyses conducted by Ančić and Domazet (2015)
and Drews and van den Bergh (2016). Voluntary frugality has been
both advocated (Schneider et al., 2010, 2011) and criticized (Romano,
2012) as a concrete degrowth implementation. Yet, it remains unclear
whether and under which conditions frugality and voluntary simplicity
appeal to a larger part of the population in afﬂuent countries5 and how
such behavior can change social norms. Clarifying these points, e.g.,
through analyzing data from social media could help optimizing com-
munication strategies in support of degrowth.
Questions of justice in a degrowth society are still open for explora-
tion (Muraca, 2012). A detailed inquiry into the societal costs of the sta-
tus quo (Lorek and Fuchs, 2013) and those of plausible degrowth
scenarios could help putting the expected societal effects of degrowth
into perspective. The analysis of the economic crisis in Cuba (Borowy,
2013) shows how case studies can provide cues on the likely impacts
(here health effects) of degrowth proposals.
Empirical assessments in the economic domain are scarce; attempts
to quantify the increasing costs and disutility of continued economic
growth are largely absent from the degrowth discourse. Behavioral as-
pects around instrumental conditioning, habits, and behavioral look-
ins in favor of prevailing economic conditions have not been addressed
in the context of degrowth. Complementary empirical research could
also seek to understand the existing potentials for continued incremen-
tal growth that expands the economy asymptotically towards the plan-
etary boundaries. The effects of zero interest and increasing reserve
requirements for banking could be investigated further (as done,
e.g., by Dittmer, 2015). Also in this respect, case studies such as those
byCanavan (2013) on the declining tourismon the Isle ofMan could ex-
aminemacro- and micro-economic impacts of degrowth at a local scale
and help addressing the hypothesis of Garcia (2012) according towhich
contraction may lead to greater economic diversiﬁcations.
5.1.4. Engineering and Technological Innovation
Engineering and technological innovation have been dealt with only
anecdotally in the degrowth discourse. The situation is about to change5 Van den Bergh (2011) and Schwartzman (2012) doubt that voluntary degrowth ﬁnds
sufﬁcient public support, while a more recent survey by Drews and van den Bergh (2016)
suggests that a third of Spanish citizens support degrowth as a policy objective.with a special issue forthcoming on this topic in fall 2016 (see Kerschner
et al., 2015). The prevailing faith in technology appears to be deeply root-
ed inWestern culture since Ancient Greek times. The theatrical represen-
tation of a comedy inwhich, when everything is devoted to a tragedy, the
impossible occurs and saves the hero, was staged by the appearance of a
Deus ex machina, both an image and a name that chieﬂy summarizes the
dogmatic belief in progress through technology (Rist, 2002).
Degrowth supporters, instead, are more skeptical about technology
that tends to ease access to natural resources, thereby expanding the re-
source base and thus the scale of the economy with negative conse-
quences degrowth aims to mitigate in ﬁrst place. However, one
stream of thought also acknowledges the virtues of technology, for ex-
ample as (i) a driver for increasing labor productivity (van den Bergh,
2011; Nørgård, 2013) which, in turn, might enable a reduction inwork-
ing time and (ii) a means to decrease the negative environmental and
health impacts of production and consumption. In fact, a versatile and
innovative technology stock can enable factor substitution in face of en-
vironmental adversity. The rising sales and declining prices of hybrid
cars after the oil price peak in 2008 (Weiss et al., 2012) or the emer-
gence of electric two-wheelers in China in response to urban air pollu-
tion (Weiss et al., 2015) highlight the importance of technological
innovation for maintaining well-being (here mobility) in times of in-
creasing resource scarcity and adverse health impacts.
The often anecdotal treatment of engineering and technological in-
novation in the context of degrowth leaves space for more in-depth re-
search. Kunze and Becker (2015) link renewable energy production to a
political issue (namely collective ownership).We see ample grounds for
similar analysis in the whole area of information technology and social
media and their impact on production, consumption, and living pat-
terns. Economic transitions could be assessed, such as shifts from low-
value added towards high-value added products, from selling products
to providing services, or frommarket transactions to non-market inter-
actions, for example, within the sharing economy or as part of social en-
terprises (Johanisova and Wolf, 2012; Johanisova et al., 2013).
Largely unexplored remains the whole ﬁeld around the effects of
technology on society, speciﬁcally conviviality. The development of in-
formation technologies and social media as communication tools in
their relation to degrowth is a fundamental issue to be analyzed: How
can they catalyze a paradigm shift through democratic processes? To
what extent can they: (i) contribute to degrowth and conviviality, (ii)
facilitate amore decentralized society, or conversely (iii) punish deviant
behavior and (iv) facilitate control of the masses? Finally, degrowth re-
search itself could beneﬁt from technology by employing increasingly
powerful open-source IT tools for the analysis of, e.g., social media data.
5.1.5. Implementation of Degrowth
The global cultural and institutional heritage suggests that degrowth
transitions will likewise be diverse (Buch-Hansen, 2014), resulting in
6 We assume here that pursuing an objective can lead to an increase or decrease of a
given parameter. If one assumes that pursuing an objective could also leave the parameter
unchanged, the space of stylized degrowth transitions increases to 3n.
7 As for neoclassical economics, postulates could be posed based on realistic anthropo-
logical cases and a new economic theory (i.e., re-embedded economics), which then could
be tested with econometrics. Furthermore, linking environmental history with the analy-
sis of the social metabolism of agrarian societies could help to interpret the relationship
between societies that accumulate and societies, deeply investigated in anthropology, that
do not accumulate and are more egalitarian.
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torically prevailing order (Boonstra and Joosse, 2013). While gover-
nance will arguably be critical to manage degrowth transitions
(Borowy, 2013), the deﬁnition of veriﬁable targets might be equally im-
portant: By how much and until when will certain activities have to
degrow so that persisting sustainability shortfalls can be addressed?
The answer to such a question will likely be case-speciﬁc and subject
to normative considerations. Yet, once clariﬁed, implementation strate-
gies for concrete policies could be devised.
Fotopoulos (2010a, 2010b) and Trainer (2010, 2014) emphasize the
incompatibility of degrowth and the market economy but elaborate lit-
tle on concrete policy scenarios to foster a large-scale transition towards
more equitable societies. A reduction in working time (e.g., van den
Bergh, 2011; Alcott, 2013; Knight et al., 2013; Andreoni and Galmarini,
2014; Fitzgerald et al., 2015) represents a concrete proposal that has re-
ceived broader attention and could indeed ﬁnd wide-spread support.
The implementation of dedicated policiesmay depend on the commu-
nication of degrowth objectives and practices to awider audience. The im-
portance of advertisement and nudging is touched by, e.g., van den Bergh
(2011) andSpangenberg (2014); yet analyses on the effectiveness of infor-
mation channels, including the aforementioned social media, to change
consumer behavior and social norms are yet missing. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that policies hampering business activity and consumption
(van den Bergh, 2011) through taxation, cost internalization, envi-
ronmental and labor standards without providing clear beneﬁts to
a larger group of stakeholders will face severe political opposition.
A limited number of case-studies has analyzed grass-root projects
such as housing communities, eco-villages, rurban squats and concrete
historical recessions cases (e.g., Cattaneo and Gavaldà, 2010; Lietaert,
2010; Nierling, 2012; Boillat et al., 2012; Canavan, 2013; Xue, 2014).
As the ﬁndings of Xue (2014) suggest, spatial decentralization in eco-
villages may come with negative social and environmental impacts.
We see important knowledge gaps in the monitoring of existing
degrowth implementations and the assessment of direct and indirect
sustainability impacts,which can then lead to an adaptation of practices.
5.2. Hypotheses Towards a Research Program on Degrowth
Could degrowth receive a wider public support? Critics such as
Tokic (2012), Romano (2012), or Schwartzman (2012), who consid-
er degrowth an unfeasible elitist project would probably say no. We
challenge this view with the following hypotheses:
• Degrowth could become popular once larger parts of the population
have reached an afﬂuence level beyond which the marginal utility of
income, possibly quantiﬁed in terms of life satisfaction, becomes neg-
ative, that is, when economic growth at societal scale becomes uneco-
nomic (see, e.g., Daly, 1999).
• Degrowth could become popular if its beneﬁts are immediate and
concrete both for the individual and the society and if experiences
are widely shared, adapted, and discussed.
• Already the contemporary socio-economic system resembles features
of a degrowth economy (examples comprise organic farming, the im-
plementation of climate targets, Peer-to-Peer sharing). Mapping such
features and understanding their principle drivers and obstacles can
identify viable connection points for degrowth implementations.
Research on degrowth still occupies only a niche in the academic lit-
erature (Vandeventer, 2016). A diversiﬁed research program could
(i) challenge the prevailing skepticism against degrowth by devising
clear situations, contexts, andboundaries forwhich the dominant growth
narrative proveswrong and (ii) shift the narrative away from ideas of ad-
versity, recession or, at best, wishful thinking to focus on the beneﬁts of
degrowth for a prosperous and equitable human development.
But how could the predominantly normative character of degrowth
be supported empirically, speciﬁcally if scientiﬁc reductionism may failto portrait the width of the degrowth imaginary? To illustrate just part
of the complexity: A set of functionally independent degrowth objec-
tives n can lead to 2n qualitatively distinct outcomes,6 spanning a huge
space of explorable degrowth transitions. A well-articulated research
programwould need to bridge science, human nature, and the diversity
of living conditions.
First, degrowth is heavily informed by the de-commodiﬁed, non-
market sphere, comprising grass-root proposals, practices of voluntary
simplicity, bottom-up initiatives, and network creating experiences.
Many of these activities are grounded in economic anthropology and
oppose the neoclassical paradigm of the homo oeconomicus. Research
could map this non-market sphere, focusing on time-use allocation in
speciﬁc non-monetary value-creating contexts and alternative econom-
ic practices (see e.g., the study of Conill et al. (2012) on Catalonia that
could be extended to a larger set of countries). Research could seek to
capture the variety of economic conditions or to dimension the poten-
tial of the Peer-to-Peer phenomenon (Kostakis et al., 2016). Such re-
search could also include value-creating practices performed as part of
household chores, the amateur economy (Nørgård, 2013), or unpaid
work (D'alisa and Cattaneo, 2013).
In Polanian terms, research on the non-market sphere of value crea-
tion would quantify the embedded economy at multiple levels, ranging
from the individual and its community to the city or country.7 Such an
empirical research could help giving the non-market sphere visibility
by quantifying (i) the time dedicated and beneﬁts obtained from non-
monetary practices and (ii) the relationships between market and
non-market practices. In parallel, a proper dataset of alternative eco-
nomic cultures should be created as a global atlas, locating in space
and in context alternative practices.
Second, the issue of decreasing paid working time and expanding
non-paid working time in the non-market sphere could be an avenue
for empirical testing. Research could depart from cases in which work
time reduction has occurred, such as in France (Haiden, 2006; Fagnani
and Letablier, 2004) or was implemented in a particular context (such
as in Sweden; TNYT, 2016) and expand with global surveys to under-
stand the choices of citizens regarding their work-life balance and the
socio-economic factors affecting such choices. Tests could devise
(i) real effects of work time reduction on income, expenditure, leisure
time, social interactions aswell as (ii) hypothetical effects of a proposed
work time reduction in the context of culture, gender, income, educa-
tion, or geographical location to answer the question: What would citi-
zens do with extra spare time?
Third, related to the lack of formal modelling identiﬁed in Section 5.1,
equilibrium agent-based or system-dynamics models to be run with em-
pirical data could address three topics: First, the issue of decoupling eco-
nomic growth from CO2 emissions (and from other environmental
impacts such as material use, land use change, or loss of biodiversity)
could bemodelled and empirically tested. For the past few decades, ener-
gy efﬁciency and the deployment of renewable energies have progressed
at the global level too slowly (IEA, 2012) to adequatelymitigate anthropo-
genic CO2 emissions. Examples of best practices from countries that have
achieved a substantial reduction in CO2 emissions despite growing their
GDP could be elaborated. The theoretical background would be the I =
PAT equivalence (Jackson, 2009) applied at country level, over the past
fewdecades, inwhich trade-related emissions are included (UNEP, 2016).
Likewise, modelling could be employed to predict the feasibility of
decarbonizing GDP under different energy intensity scenarios; the
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technological improvement are documented.
Second, since the fear of unemployment, to a large extent driven by in-
creasing productivity and a global division of labor, constitutes an impor-
tant objection against degrowth, models that show how job creation can
bedecoupled fromeconomic growth could be created. If properly calibrat-
ed, such models could be run on empirical macroeconomic data and pre-
dict trends and conditions in which such decoupling would occur. The
models could also demonstrate how and under which conditions well-
being effects materialize. Bilancini and D'Alessandro (2012) address this
subject by investigatingwith anendogenous growthmodel (that accounts
for the externalities of consumption, leisure, and production) the well-
being effects of hypothetical degrowth transitions. Heikkinen (2015) has
expanded this model which could be further advanced by linking leisure
and non-market production to study well-being effects of speciﬁc policy
interventions. Finally, the feedback loops identiﬁed by Videira et al.
(2014) can provide the ground for modelling that seeks to parameterize
variables, quantify the magnitude of feedbacks, and assess the impact of
dedicated interventions in view of the various degrowth objectives.
6. Discussion
Degrowth is amarginal left-wing Europeanposition (Krugman, 2014)
in the tradition of social and environmental activism. The degrowth dis-
course spans an increasingly diverse body of multi-disciplinary research
at the intersection of social and environmental sciences.
With the methodological limitations sketched in Section 2, the out-
come of our review suggests that the history, concept, and rationale
for degrowth are well explained. Yet, the largely descriptive academic
discourse lacks rigid hypotheses testing through modelling and empiri-
cal assessments. By addressing the research questions and hypotheses
identiﬁed in Section 5, the academic degrowth discourse could make
an important contribution to the debate around a sustainable post-
growth development (see also Escobar, 2015).
We expect that degrowthmay only receive broader public support if
themarginal beneﬁts of the status quo become smaller than those of the
next best degrowth scenario for large parts of the population. The
degrowth discourse has qualitatively discussed the deﬁciencies of the
status quo but spent little effort to quantify the costs of continued eco-
nomic growth as well as the well-being beneﬁts of degrowth.
Moreover, growth policiesmay not necessarily be abandoned onaﬁ-
nite planet earth. Instead, such policies may allow making maximum
use of available resources (be it through expanded resource extraction,
technological innovation, or increased commodiﬁcation of society) in
the short term, while in parallel enabling the development of means
to cope with environmental limits in the long term. Drought in
California arguably forced residential water consumption to decrease
in 2014 by some 30% (Reese, 2015) without causing major social
disruptions. Such a decrease may not have been achievable by
appealing to voluntary frugality nor may have water-saving policies
obtained sufﬁcient public support by pointing out unsustainable water
consumption. The observed water savings might be temporary but
show the capacity of humans to adapt in face of acute resource
shortage. The case also points to the importance of technology as a
catalyst for factor substitution in production and consumption in
response to environmental constraints.
To be successful, degrowth has to identify a concrete and inclusive
development perspective (see Schwartzman, 2012) for the afﬂuent
and powerful elites and the marginalized poor. Direct beneﬁts of
degrowth might be experienced by consumers in areas where further
growth has obviously become undesirable, such as in the health care in-
dustry as illustrated byMissoni (2015), in the food, nutrition and the ag-
ricultural sector, or in urban transportation. Degrowth could address
psychological stress related to over consumption, long working hours,
and the commodiﬁcation of social relations and highlight the beneﬁts
of a simpliﬁed life style away from positional competition and towardsmore collaborative community development. Addressing life quality
around resonant human interactions (Rosa, 2015) in face of increasing
competition and individuation may be a viable angle to highlight the
beneﬁts of degrowth. Decreasing working time can mitigate environ-
mental degradation (Knight et al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2015) and pro-
vide a leverage point for virtually all other degrowth proposals. In fact,
we would regard a decrease in working time as the single silver bullet
through which degrowth can yield personal welfare gains, increase en-
vironmental sustainability, enhance democracy, and thus obtain the
support of larger parts of the population. Yet, to be a fulﬁlling choice, re-
duced working time, and degrowth in more general, may hinge on a
wider cultural recognition (see, e.g., Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012)
that still appears to be hampered under the present societal conditions.
Kallis (2013) argues that societies have the capacity to steer social
processes towards degrowth, thereby opposing the view of Sorman
and Giampietro (2013) who consider that societies are destined to
grow, crash, and adapt. We see a larger and more differentiated space
of development to which the degrowth discourse contributes visions
for both social and economic adaptation and the mitigation of environ-
mental impacts. In a resource-constraint world, degrowth may occur as
a gradual and locally-speciﬁc transition (Buch-Hansen, 2014).We argue
with Ott (2012) in favor of political prudence through addressing spe-
ciﬁc problems with speciﬁc policies and against the pursuit of grand
new utopias that often come with unintended consequences.
7. Conclusions
Throughout millennia, the anthroposphere has been expanding
both as a consequence and driver of human development. On a ﬁnite
planet, this expansion will eventually come to an end. The political
degrowth movement has established a discourse about the fundamen-
tal questions around this perspective. Whether the limits to growth
should be anticipated by policy (as proposed by degrowth advocates)
or dealt with retrospectively in face of acute adversity, is a normative
rather than scientiﬁc question. Yet, the academic degrowth discourse
can help testing hypotheses, provide models, empirical data, and an al-
ternative vision of human development. Degrowth may reach a wider
audience if it can identify and communicate concrete well-being bene-
ﬁts. If degrowth is a political slogan (Latouche, 2010) with theoretical
and practical implications, the academia has just began to analyze
these. By developing positive visions, and presenting implementable
solutions, degrowth could contribute to a prosperous yet equitable, par-
ticipatory, and environmentally sustainable society.
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Table A1
Key features of the reviewed articles; assertions presented here reﬂect our understanding of the respective article but may not capture in all detail the message intended by the authors
History and context - Degrowth:
-entered French politics in 1979 (1), echoes the utopist
ideas of Rousseau and Godwin (6), draws from the
theoretical contributions of Gorz (54), and merges ideas of
Francophone décroissance and Anglophone ecological
economics (8)
-was subject of disagreement between Georgescu-Roegen
and the Club of Rome (7) and united in 2007 French and
Italian proponents of convivial, autonomous, and
sustainable societies (3)
-entered the academic debate after the ﬁrst degrowth
conference (Paris, France, 2008; 56)
Characterization of the economy
-capitalist and socialist economies are growth oriented
and intrinsically unsustainable (2)
- globalization broke the historical balance between
capitalism and democracy (42) and triggered a spiral of
environmental, economic, and social crises (23)
-property expansion subordinates society and
environment under capitalist requirements (15) and leads
to power concentration, circular self-expansion,
path-dependent lock-in, discouraging non-compliant
behavior (36)
-increasing energy prices absorb capital and enhance the
risk of debt default and economic recession (48)
-negative growth-related impacts are relevant in
high-income Eastern regions of China (38)
Elements of systems theory
- a systems perspective can reveal mechanisms underlying
the market economy (32) that constitutes a complex
system, operating between order and chaos, displaying
scale invariance, power-law distributions, phase
transitions, and self-organized criticality (79)
Conceptual aspects – Degrowth:
-is a political slogan with theoretical implications, revolving around 8 R’s:
revalue, re-conceptualize, restructure, relocate, redistribute, reduce, reuse, and
recycle (12)
-constitutes a paradigmatic proposal for an equitable downscaling, revitalized
democracy, and improved environmental conditions (14,22,84) that criticizes
sustainable development and argues in favor of anti-utilitarianism,
bio-economics, justice (52), and inclusive democracy through the
establishment of a popular base of political and economic power (16)
-calls for a new social, utopic, and subversive imaginary (82), reclaimed
democracy and re-politicized economic relations and identities (4)
- embraces cultural and political change (20) whose relationship to democracy
can be clariﬁed by Castoriadis’ thoughts on democracy and autonomy (50)
-means a voluntary transition towards a just, participatory, and ecologically
sustainable society (9) through a bottom-up process that shares views of the
political left and right in France (1)
-requires management (68) and could be shaped by social practices
implemented by socio-environmental movements (41) and the goal of a
steady-state economy (11,51)
-trajectories include demonetized, self-organized forms of commons-based
solidarity economies (70)
-is inevitable as fossil fuels become scarce (30) and the Northern countries path
towards a steady-state economy (10); transition will take different forms and
lead to a variety of outcomes due to institutional and cultural diversity (76)
-calls for a reduction of paid but not un-paid work and may not per se increase
institutional costs (63): a decrease in production and consumption and an
increase in leisure appears feasible, can be socially sustainable (29) and
increase overall welfare (89)
-is subject to understanding the functional lock-in of the economy and
subordinating the latter to social and ecological imperatives (15)
-can draw from the insight gained by ecological economics (31), responds to
the physical, ecological, social, and economic limits and draws from a vibrant
research agenda (66)
-can be assessed by applying the concept of environmental space (78) and
biophysical and social indicators based on a unifying conceptual framework
(34)
-alters societal metabolism, human life styles (67), and is linked to strong
sustainable consumption through various interdependencies (64)
-interventions, feedback, and leverage points can be understood through causal
loop diagrams (73) and could be normatively underpinned by Sen’s and
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (44)
-necessitates a fundamental transformation of institutions (23), can lead to
further democratization on grounds of Habermas’ deliberative democracy (45)
and be pursued through environmental and redistributive policies (20),
fostering social protection and income equality (80)
-potentials for conscious change can be identiﬁed by taking an evolutionary
perspective (43)
-will show bricolage, translation, path-dependency, and inherited legacy of
diverse cultural conditions (76), may be associated with increased competition
and regulatory interventions (53), could be be supported by payments for
environmental services as a transition instrument (90)
Complementary initiatives
-post-development, sharing with degrowth common imaginaries, goals, and
predicaments (85)
-environmental justice movement (5,26), inclusive democracy (16,17), and transition
movement (55)
-ecofeminist economics (74), earth jurisprudence (19), and de-alienation to re-integrate
humans in harmony with nature (24)
-bourgeois primitivism that propagates environmentalism as self-improvement exercise
for the elite (25)
Deviant views and degrowth critique
-Latouche and Fotopoulos hold misconceptions about Castoriadis’ notion of autonomy,
which limits their view on degrowth trajectories (50)
-degrowth is ambiguous, ineffective, and unfeasible – a-growth should be pursued by
effective sustainability policies (21)
-degrowth is inadequate to address the multidimensional crisis (17) – The ‘Simpler Way’
constitutes a concrete eco-anarchist vision for local self-sustained communities (71)
-degrowth does not provide a concrete positive vision of the future (27) but would cause the
economy to implode and eventually grow again (35)
-degrowth insufﬁciently addresses militarism, imperialism, and the observation that the
various forms of growth differ in their environmental and social effects (28)
-degrowth-democracy relationship is problematic (46)
Empirical insights
-public support for degrowth is small but higher in wealthy than in poor European
countries (83)
-health trends are inconsistent during the economic crisis in the 1990s in Cuba (58) and
in 2008 in northern countries (80)
-declining tourism on the Isle of Man (UK) caused economic diversiﬁcation and negative
environmental and social impacts (68)
-degrowth could decrease Canadian GHG emissions by 80% between 2005 and 2035 (37)
-localization and decentralization by eco/urban villages can contradict environmental
degrowth objectives (75)
-half (550Mt) of the global copper reserves are extracted; a global per capita copper stock
of 100 kg appears to be sustainable (69)
-empirical data inconclusive about causality between energy use and GDP (77)
-the Spanish agri-food system consumes 1408 PJ primary energy, which is 7.4 times the
residential energy use in Spain (61)
-the energy intensity of unpaid work in Catalonia is lower than that of the service and
governmental sector (59)
-growth in housing stock has only weakly decoupled from environmental impacts (91)
Degrowth implementations through:
-cohousing (13) and rurban squats (10), voluntary frugality, and a simpler way of living
(39,47,49)
-cooperative, self-governed, and local economies (18)
-non-market capitals exchanged by primary and secondary social enterprises (62)
-reduction of paid work, expansion of reciprocity work and unpaid work (33,72) in an
amateur economy (72) and a universal job guarantee that decouples the labor market
from economic development (57)
-autonomous small farmer’s cooperatives (40) and co-production of farmers and
consumers via community-supported agriculture (81)
-manufacturing on high-value added niche products such as gluten-free beer (88)
-reuse of reclaimed water and desalination (60), collective ownership of renewable
energy supply projects (86)
-reformed global health governance and degrowth in the health care industry (87)
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